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Standing at a Crossroads: The Building Trades in the 
Twenty-First Century 
Mark Erlich and Jeff Grabelsky 
American building trades unions have historically played a critical and stabilizing role in 
the nation’s construction industry, establishing uniform standards and leveling the competitive 
playing field. Union members have enjoyed better than average wages and benefits, excellent 
training opportunities, and decent jobsite conditions. But in the last thirty years the industry has 
undergone a dramatic transformation. This article describes the decline in union density, the 
drop in construction wages, the growth of anti-union forces, the changes in labor force 
demographics, the shift toward construction management, and the emergence of an underground 
economy. It also analyzes how building trades unions have responded to these changes, 
identifies structural impediments to union renewal, and proposes strategies for building trades 
unions to reassert their presence and power. 
The curved facade of a new US$65 million Salt Lake City public library is made up of 
2,000 individual pre-cast concrete panels. Arriving on giant flatbed trucks in a total of 140 
separate shipments, the 10-ton loads of panels were driven from Pretesca, a factory outside of 
Mexico City, to Utah. The library’s general contractor and architectural team had sought bids 
from pre-cast plants in Phoenix, Denver, and Las Vegas, but, according to project manager Steve 
Crane, ‘Pretesca’s low-cost labor made up for the higher shipping costs, and they came in 
cheapest.’ The fact that the substantial trucking costs of a 2,350-mile journey did not eliminate 
the savings realized by low-waged labor in a Mexican plant is an indication of the gross wage 
disparity between the two countries. In this case, the domestic labor premium cannot be 
attributed to high union wages. The three competing southwestern factories were not unionized 
and Utah’s on-site construction labor force is overwhelmingly non-union and, for that matter, 
often of Mexican background.1 
There is nothing new about international participation in the United States economy. 
Producers of auto, steel, textiles, electronics, and other durable goods are disappearing from the 
American scene, replaced by low-waged competitors in developing countries. But construction 
had been largely immune to the dynamics of global production. The physical creation of 
buildings, unlike cars, shirts, or televisions, does not lend itself to overseas assembly, in part or 
in whole, as long as the object is the ultimate placement of the product on a parcel of land in an 
American city. 
Construction has been considered the largest of the non-service sectors to stand on the 
sidelines and watch the globalization parade pass by. Construction employers traditionally hired 
a workforce that lived in or near their projects’ communities. Every city or town had its own 
home-grown group of building trades workers, generally accounting for about five percent of an 
area’s total workforce. The trades offered young men well-paying jobs without their having to 
pursue a college degree or professional career. The work may have been insecure—the 
Millman, ‘Blueprint for Outsourcing.’ 
unemployment rate in construction is typically double that of all other industries—but that was 
inherent in an industry of short-term projects subject to the vagaries of business cycles and 
seasonal swings. An individual might work for dozens of employers on hundreds of sites over a 
lifetime, but he was part of a mobile yet stable community of trades workers that operated within 
defined geographical boundaries. 
Construction is a trillion-dollar industry employing over six million workers. Despite the cyclical 
nature of construction, employment among the industry’s half million firms has steadily risen 
over the past thirty years. And while the industry is now characterized by increasingly 
consolidated national and multinational building corporations, historically the overwhelming 
majority of construction workers were employed by firms of fewer than twenty workers. 
During most of the post-1945 era, a tradesman could hope for and expect one of the 
higher standards of living available to blue-collar workers. Trade unions had gained a foothold in 
the industry by the late nineteenth century and their members were mockingly labeled labor 
aristocrats because of the sizable gap between construction and factory earnings. The union 
presence brought relatively high hourly wages and, in time, well-run training programs and an 
impressive range of benefits. From a contractor’s perspective, trade unions added a measure of 
stability to a wildly unstable business. The unions served as a hiring hall for employers whose 
workforce expanded and contracted on a weekly basis. The cost of the apprenticeship programs 
was spread out across the employer community so that no single contractor had to bear the 
financial burden of training employees. The master agreements set a uniform wage standard in 
an area, creating a level playing field for labor costs, thereby reducing the volatility of the 
industry’s constant bidding wars. In exchange for these union functions, building employers 
provided better than average compensation and developed a work environment that served to 
recruit and retain a steady stream of qualified workers. 
Today, it has become more difficult to recruit new entrants into the field because the 
status of construction jobs is diminishing. ‘Everybody thinks that construction is the armpit of 
jobs,’ a Florida union official told a Wall Street Journal reporter. ‘No parent wants their kid to be 
a construction worker.’2 A 2000 Clemson University survey of 1,800 construction craft workers 
revealed that 70 percent did not want their children to take up their career path.3 
Changes in the day-to-day tasks of trades workers do not explain construction’s shifting 
status perceptions. In fact, construction is one of the major industries least affected by 
technological change and innovation. Craftsmen still use some tools and techniques that have 
been around for a century or longer. Weather conditions can still be unbearably hot in the middle 
of summer and insufferably cold in a freezing winter. The job remains dirty, difficult, and 
dangerous. How has a career in the construction industry been transformed from a legitimate 
path to the American Dream to one that many avoid? 
The seismic shifts in the industry date back over thirty years and were driven by a 
combination of factors that dramatically weakened the presence and power of building trades 
unions. In the 1960s, the majority of construction activity in the US was performed on a union 
basis. As the military commitment in Vietnam escalated and the American economy heated up, 
the supply of skilled laborers contracted, allowing building trades unions to exercise what 
Fortune magazine described as ‘murderous bargaining power’ and win increasingly rich 
contracts for their members.4 Construction contractors simply passed on the rising costs of these 
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collective bargaining agreements to corporate users who were engaged in major expansion 
projects. In response, corporate owners formed the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable 
(later renamed the Business Roundtable) in 1969. They launched a campaign and issued a series 
of reports intended to undermine the strength and vitality of construction unions, recommending 
changes in contracting practices, job referrals, and training programs. Some giant firms, like 
Dow and Du Pont, refused to consider bids from union contractors, and others contracted with 
fledgling non-union builders in an effort to promote an alternative to unionized construction. 
The legal and regulatory environment also impacted building trades unions. During the 
1970s, unions fought to pass a common-situs picketing bill that would have allowed a single 
union engaged in a dispute with one of many contractors on a construction site to picket every 
point of entry to the site and thus potentially shut down the entire project. But in 1976, President 
Ford vetoed the bill and today construction unions are still hamstrung by requirements that 
picketing occur only at an arbitrarily determined ‘neutral’ gate. In 1977, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) issued the Kiewit decision, which loosened restrictions on ‘double-
breasting,’ thus making it easier for unionized contractors to establish non-union subsidiaries and 
escape the obligations of their contractual agreements with building trades unions. Within ten 
years, eight of the top ten American building contractors were double-breasted. In 1987, the 
Board decided in Deklewa that unionized employers who had signed pre-hire agreements with 
building trades unions were no longer obligated to negotiate successor contracts, further 
weakening the collective bargaining system that had served and stabilized the construction 
industry well for several decades. 
A rapidly expanding non-union labor market grew with the industry’s expansion as 
exclusionary membership policies prevented workers from joining building trades unions. For 
example, from 1965 to 1990, the electrical construction workforce almost tripled in size—from 
200,000 to 550,000—while International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
construction membership remained virtually unchanged at about 140,000. As a result, union 
workforce density among construction electricians dropped from about 70 to 25 percent in a 
single generation.5 This process was common across all the trades. It is difficult to track and 
measure union membership and density in the construction industry because of the transient 
nature of the workforce. But, according to the Building and Construction Trades Department 
(AFL-CIO), from 1973 to 2002 union membership declined from 1.6 to 1.2 million, while the 
unorganized construction workforce grew from 2.5 to 5.5 million. Consequently, union density 
dropped from 39.5 to 17.4 percent during that period of time.6 The most recent data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that the trend is continuing with density falling to 14.7 
percent in 2004. 
This process of decline has a geographic dimension. In the mid-1970s, construction union 
density in 22 states was between 30 and 50 percent and in seven states it was over 50 percent. In 
the mid-1980, construction union density in 11 states was between 30 and 50 percent and was 
over 50 percent in only two states—Illinois and Hawaii. By the mid-1990s, no states had a 
construction workforce that was over 50 percent unionized and in only six states was density 
above 30 percent. This regional dynamic contributed to one of the defining characteristics of the 
contemporary construction industry—a shrinking number of urban markets where building trades 
unions remain relatively strong and provide decent wages and benefits for their members, and 
5
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vast areas where, according to some international union presidents, ‘we are not even in the 
ga me.’ 7 
Declining unionization did not occur uniformly across every segment of the industry. 
Because building trades unions focused primarily on the large industrial projects that consumed 
the lion’s share of construction dollars in the 1960s and 1970s, they remained relatively strong in 
that segment of the industry. But their presence on commercial and residential projects 
diminished, a problem that became more severe as relative expenditures on residential 
construction increased. According to Laborers president Terry O’Sullivan, in 2004 about 57 
percent of every construction dollar was spent in the residential segment, where ‘we have 
virtually no presence.’8 Like the Laborers, most building trades unions have primarily focused 
on retaining a presence in the industrial, heavy highway, and large commercial segments of the 
industry. This has contributed to another defining characteristic of contemporary construction— 
large and growing segments of the industry are outside the union sphere of influence even in the 
large urban markets where overall union presence remains relatively strong. 
Declining union density may have been a serious problem for the building trades, but it 
was hailed by corporate executives, like Charles Brown, former CEO of Du Pont and a leader of 
the Business Roundtable, who wrote, ‘The construction industry was monopolized by the union 
segment with no apparent alternative in sight. Fortunately for all of us, the capitalistic system 
worked again. ‘‘Free market’’ forces prevailed.’9 Construction users benefited from those ‘free 
market’ forces in the short run, but over time they bore a cost. Even in the short run, workers in 
the industry paid a price. 
Construction workers—union and non-union, alike—now tend to work harder, for less 
money, and under harsher conditions. As a result of the rise of the Roundtable and the anti-union 
Associated Builders and Contractors (ABC), and the broad-based attack on labor, building 
tradesmen, once in the upper echelon of American workers, have seen their occupations slip to 
the low status job that is more characteristic of construction workers in other parts of the world.10 
In 1967, construction employees in the United States earned more than industrial workers in 
petro-chemical refining, steel mills, motor vehicles, aircraft, or chemicals; by 1997, construction 
workers earned less than employees in each of these five industries. As recently as 1983, median 
weekly earnings in the construction trades exceeded the median for all workers by 20 percent. In 
a remarkable drop in what could be characterized as a ‘labor aristocracy index,’ the difference 
between construction workers and all other workers was only 3 percent in 1999.11 The Building 
and Construction Trades Department (AFL-CIO) reports that between 1973 and 2002 average 
hourly earnings for all construction workers declined from US$25.27 to US$20.85, or 17.5 
percent.12 
But an analysis that focuses on gross numbers for all construction misses the underlying 
reality of an increasingly bifurcated industry in the contemporary United States. Workers in the 
trades are in one of two separate worlds. In and around urban areas in the northeast, midwest, 
and the West Coast, many craft workers are compensated under the terms of collective 
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bargaining agreements. Even many nonunion contractors in those areas pay lower but 
comparable rates, for fear of losing their employees to unionized companies. These union 
members continue to receive higher than average blue-collar wages, health insurance, and 
generous retirement benefits. When the union apprenticeship programs open their ranks, there is 
no shortage of applicants because the building trades in these areas still have a reputation as 
desirable careers for young workers. 
On the other hand, the conditions of non-union construction workers, especially in the 
southeast, southwest, Gulf Coast, and Rocky Mountain states, have been so degraded that there is 
a constant complaint about labor shortages. Even in the more unionized west, a 1995 survey of 
contractors found that 56 percent of the union employers had no issues with the supply of 
manpower while about 90 percent of the open shop firms did.13 As the construction boom of the 
late 1990s developed, the shortage of skilled labor in the south became a constant subject in 
industry journals. 
In a moment of candor, Frank Yancey, senior vice-president of Kellogg, Brown & Root 
(KBR), the nation’s third-largest contractor, noted that a Gulf Coast construction worker ‘is not a 
craftsman today, it is a poor person.’14 In the summer of 2000, Yancey told his colleagues at the 
Construction Industry Institute, ‘If low pay was a felony, I think most of us would be on death 
row today.’15 Ted Kennedy, chairman of BE&K (a multinational construction and engineering 
firm), and a long-time spokesman for the ABC and anti-union forces in the industry, commented, 
‘We reap the crop we sow, and we have not sown enough seeds . . . I have a belief that wages are 
way too low.’16 Yancey and Kennedy are representatives of prominent builders and industry 
leaders with clout, but their comments are hollow. Competitive pressures bar the likelihood of 
unilateral pay hike policies by KBR, BE&K, or any other company. Wages in the areas their 
companies work in have been dropping steadily for thirty years and this trend shows no signs of 
abating. 
In 2001, Edward Steimel issued a report on the state of the industry in Louisiana. Steimel 
had been the president of the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry and had led the 
successful campaign to pass a right-to-work law in the state in 1976. Twenty-five years later, 
Steimel argued that ‘the pendulum has swung too far.’ Noting that average construction wages in 
Louisiana were US$10 an hour lower than in states like Michigan and New Jersey and even 
US$3 an hour less than in neighboring Texas, Steimel said that the attraction of higher pay in 
other states or better-paying factory jobs in Louisiana was the cause of the extreme shortages of 
skilled construction workers.17 
With wages too low to attract the industry’s traditional demographic base of recruits, 
contractors turned to immigrants to fill the vacuum. If the standard forms of international 
competition—outsourcing and overseas production—did not apply to construction, then 
globalization could come in the back door. Thousands of hopeful workers—some documented, 
some not—crossed the Mexican border every week, fanned out across the southern and western 
states, and joined immigrants from Central America, Latin America, and Eastern Europe to work 
on construction projects all across the country. Some observers have suggested that Hispanics 
will make up nearly half of the nation’s construction workforce by 2010. 
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Current government estimates place the total number of undocumented workers in the 
United States around nine million, but private researchers claim that an accurate number might 
be closer to 20 million. 18 No one knows how many are working in construction, but 
undocumented immigrants are clearly the industry’s backbone in many areas and even in 
subsectors like residential and light commercial in still strong union markets. ‘If the government 
clamped down on all the people who are not fully legal and kicked them out,’ said Don Hiatt of 
Tri-State Drywall of Rockville, Maryland in the wake of calls for tightened borders after 9/11, 
‘construction would shut down.’19 
Today a union carpenter in New York City will likely earn five times more in wages and 
benefits than a carpenter in Orlando for the same work. Still, an immigrant who works as a 
wood-framer or drywaller in Florida for a portion of the year, sending money home on a regular 
basis, can earn eight times as much as he would in his native Mexican village.20 One indicator of 
the growing immigrant presence in the workforce is the fact that monetary remittances from the 
US to Mexico tripled to US$13.2 billion between 1995 and 2000.21 Surely, the chance to boost 
family earnings motivates new immigrants, but the vulnerability of their legal status forces them 
to accept whatever conditions are offered. As Laborers President Terry O’Sullivan has noted, 
current immigration policies as well as all the proposals for temporary worker programs do not 
‘free a worker to voice concern over job safety or wages.’22 
The stories of employer abuse are widespread. A Houston developer rejected a US$325 
000 bid from an abatement company as part of his planned renovation of an old hospital building. 
Instead, he hired ten undocumented Mexican farm workers for US$2000 apiece to remove 
fireproofing material that he neglected to inform them was laced with toxic asbestos.23 The 
backdrop of deportation serves as an effective deterrent to protest. During a Carpenters Union 
campaign against Utah Structural Coatings in Salt Lake City, the owner threatened deportation 
and fired over forty undocumented employees, effectively undermining all organizing efforts.24 
Under the current administration employers hiring undocumented workers have little to fear. 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly Immigration and Naturalization 
Services) enforcement actions against employers and undocumented workers have dropped 
sharply since 1997, from 18,000 to fewer than 1,000 arrests in 2002.25 This dynamic is as 
common on publicly funded jobs as it is on private projects. When a rare government raid 
resulted in the deportation of 32 undocumented immigrants working on a US$163 million federal 
courthouse in Miami in 2003, the contractor, Jim Renaud of Capform, evinced little sympathy 
for the disruptions in his workers’ lives, but complained that his firm lost ‘half a million and five 
weeks of work.’26 
Policymakers and business leaders justify minimal immigration enforcement practices 
because they argue that US citizens are uninterested in these jobs and the work has to be 
completed. As President George W. Bush claimed, ‘there are some jobs in America that 
18
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Americans won’t do and others are willing to do.’27 Bush has it backwards. American citizens 
want the jobs; they do not, however, want to work for the minimal wages that the jobs now pay. 
When the compensation is reasonable, manpower shortages quickly disappear. 
The management structure and organization of work have also changed over the past 
thirty years. Throughout the first three-quarters of the last century, general contractors stood at 
the center of the industry. Whenever a private or public owner sought to build a project, general 
contractors bid a fixed price to perform the work. The successful bidder was the contact with the 
owner as well as the direct employer of many of the people who would bring the project to 
completion. General contractors typically employed carpenters and laborers and, in some cases, 
bricklayers, ironworkers, operating engineers, and painters. The mechanical portions of a project 
were subcontracted to specialty electrical, plumbing, and other contractors that usually had prior 
business relationships with the general contractor. 
The founding owner of a general contracting firm had generally worked his way up the 
ranks and was personally familiar with the daily challenges facing the craftsmen he employed. If 
direction of the firm was later handed off to the next generation, there was an assumption that the 
heir to the throne should spend some time in the field before moving into the office. Job-site 
superintendents were also usually craftsmen themselves. Between 1967 and 1997, general 
contractors cut their share of construction worker employment from 35 percent to 24 percent of 
the labor force; specialty trade subcontractors, on the other hand, went from 48 percent to 63 
percent. 28 The self-performing general contractor that was thoroughly integrated into every 
operation of a project evolved into a construction manager whose responsibility was limited to 
managing and coordinating a series of specialized subcontractors that employed the men and 
women who carried out the on-site tasks. 
These new highly capitalized brokers have divorced themselves from hands-on 
construction work and focused on business development and project management. They are no 
longer producers of goods; they ‘have turned into service companies, finding clients and 
marketing products that are then produced by subcontractors.’ 29 Construction management 
executives are building professionals with limited connections to the tools, craft knowledge, and 
working lives of the trades workers on the job. Even their job-site superintendents are as likely to 
be graduates of civil engineering schools as of the industry’s home-grown apprenticeship 
programs. All risk and liability are shifted from the hands of the construction manager to the 
subcontractor. The price for estimating mistakes, workplace injuries, materials delays, or any of 
the other standard hurdles is borne entirely by the subcontractor, who is also responsible for the 
management of labor relations. 
The growing use of immigrant workers meshes with the structural trend toward 
subcontracting. As general contractors/construction managers shift on-site labor responsibilities 
to an array of mobile subcontractors, intermediaries such as temporary employment agencies or 
individual labor brokers emerge that seek to provide non-union firms some of the referral 
services offered to unionized contractors by a union hiring hall. Undocumented Latino workers 
frequently operate under the direction of a coyote, an operative who arranges for border 
crossings out of Mexico and job placements on construction sites in the US. They make travel 
and lodging arrangements and negotiate the financial terms with the contractors. They do not 
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need any particular construction or supervision skills, just a cell phone and a list of available 
workers. 
The increased use of undocumented workers also complements the growing presence of 
the underground economy in construction. It is a small step for an unscrupulous employer to 
move from hiring undocumented workers to operating entirely off the books—or vice versa. 
There are a wide variety of illicit employment relations, ranging from handling all transactions in 
cash to a sophisticated system of misclassifying employees as ‘independent contractors’ in order 
to avoid tax, insurance, and a host of regulatory obligations. 
An army of lawyers and accountants has emerged to advise construction employers how 
to shift employees off payrolls into self-employed status. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
spokesmen recognize that ‘more and more people are being treated as independent contractors’ 
and construction is a prime culprit.30 Legitimate contractors that maintain payrolls and play by 
the rules are at a competitive disadvantage against firms that misclassify and, thereby, realize 
substantial labor cost savings. As their less scrupulous peers repeatedly submit lower contract 
bids, they are forced to adopt the same fraudulent and illegal practices or watch business 
opportunities evaporate. Workers who are labeled independent contractors are not eligible for 
legally required protections, such as unemployment, workers’ compensation insurance, 
mandatory overtime, and other wage laws. 
While data on lost revenues from unreported sources are, by definition, sketchy, a few 
studies indicate the extent of the problem. A US Department of Labor report suggested that 
misclassification results in a loss of US$198 million a year to various unemployment insurance 
trust funds and 80,000 workers who are entitled to benefits are not receiving them. 31 
Massachusetts, a state with a relatively strong regulatory environment, reportedly loses US$152 
million in state income taxes due to misclassification.32 In Florida, the workers compensation 
program collapsed completely under the weight of construction employer fraud. Though 
premiums were the second highest in the nation, insurance carriers refused to issue new policies 
and medical providers began to refuse workers compensation patients because they feared lack 
of reimbursement from a fund that contractors had shorted US$1.3 billion a year in premium 
payments.33 
Some researchers have attempted to estimate the full impact of the underground labor 
force—not just what is revealed in official data sources. For example, a Bear Stearns report 
claims that the US Treasury is actually losing US$35 billion a year in income tax collections 
because of the number of jobs that are now entirely off the books.34 The overall underground 
economy is estimated to be nearly US$3 trillion a year, nine percent of the real economy, and the 
gap between taxes collected and taxes that should be paid is expected to be as high as US$400 
billion in 2005.35 
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The decline in union density, the drop in construction wages, the growth of anti-union 
forces, changes in labor force demographics, the shift towards construction management, and the 
emergence of an underground economy provide the backdrop for a very different industry. 
Legitimate employers—union or nonunion— that provide a living wage and benefits for their 
employees are constantly looking over their shoulders at the legions of subcontractors that play 
by a different set of rules. 
This reality has forced building trades unionists to recognize that their world has changed. 
Virtually every aspect of union affairs in the construction industry was predicated on an 
assumption of power that was derived from relatively high union density and union control of the 
skilled labor supply. But as the non-union workforce rapidly expanded through the 1970s and 
1980s, union density continued to decline and union control began to unravel. Rather than 
confronting the fundamental problem by organizing the non-union labor force, many building 
trades leaders seemed trapped in denial. ‘We refused to accept that the world was changing and 
continued doing what we had done for decades,’ explained one leader.36 
Some of the choices the building trades made were counterproductive. For example, in 
the 1960s and 1970s, huge industrial construction projects offered lucrative contracts to 
signatory employers and steady employment for union members, both of whom abandoned less 
attractive commercial and residential projects that were gradually captured by non-union 
contractors. This gave the open shop a foothold in traditional union submarkets. In many regions 
these megaprojects generated labor demands that exceeded the union supply. But rather than 
exploiting the tight labor market conditions to organize more members, local unions invited 
‘travelers’ from other jurisdictions to help staff these jobs or issued temporary permits to non-
union workers who were never offered union membership. These ‘permit hands’ acquired new 
and valuable skills working on union jobs, but they also developed deep resentments toward the 
union because of its exclusionary membership policies. These skills and resentments were to 
come back to haunt unions in the years ahead. 
There were building trades leaders who recognized the threat posed by non-union 
contractors that underbid signatory employers and won projects that might otherwise have 
employed union members. These leaders explored ways to make union contractors more 
competitive. Initially this meant looking for cost savings that could be achieved through direct 
concessions to employers, sometimes on targeted jobs and other times through wage freezes and 
givebacks in collective bargaining agreements. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, national 
agreements were negotiated for major construction projects that offered union contractors relief 
on wages and work rules. Local unions also negotiated concessionary deals to help local 
contractors withstand the competitive pressures of low-bidding non-union builders. In 1984, 
wage cuts and freezes actually outnumbered wage hikes in union contracts. 37 Unfortunately, as 
non-union competition drove down union scales, non-union wages followed suit. 
Building trades leaders soon devised more creative ways to cut direct labor costs. For 
example, market recovery funds were established to provide subsidies to unionized contractors 
who bid on projects the local union regarded as strategically important. Some believed these 
efforts enabled unionized employers to capture work they might otherwise have lost to the non-
union competition, but others feared the funds enriched signatories and developers without 
stemming the tide of the open shop. Competitiveness strategies were not confined to labor cost 
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cutting alone. Union leaders worked closely with their business counterparts to elevate labor– 
management cooperation, to promote the advantages of building union to construction users and 
the consuming public, to minimize unnecessary job-site conflicts that delayed projects (and thus 
raised the costs of union construction), to enhance the skill and productivity of union members 
through training and upgrading, and to eliminate archaic work rules that disadvantaged union 
contractors. 
Unions have also negotiated project-specific agreements requiring the exclusive use of 
union labor in exchange for special provisions that enhance productivity, avoid labor disruptions, 
and ensure construction completion dates in both the private and public sectors. In 1993, the 
United States Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in the Boston Harbor case authorizing 
the use of Project Labor Agreements, or PLAs, on certain public construction projects. Anti-
union critics have claimed that PLAs increase construction costs and disadvantage open shop 
contractors. Project Labor Agreements advocates dispute these claims, point out important labor 
cost savings, and suggest that these project-specific agreements serve the public interest. Many 
unionists praise these Project Labor Agreements as effective tools to fight the open shop. But 
others argue that in some markets PLAs allow non-union contractors to cherry-pick projects by 
agreeing only to their project-specific terms without having to sign area standard collective 
bargaining agreements. As such, these critics suggest that PLAs may contribute to the dissolution 
of collective bargaining in the construction industry. 
In many markets, local unions used direct action to neutralize the non-union threat. They 
hand-billed and picketed non-union job-sites, claiming that open shop contractors were 
undermining community standards. These tactics occasionally embarrassed companies that were 
using non-union builders, but rarely persuaded decision-makers to abandon these contractors or 
to hire union signatories. Sometimes several building trades affiliates engaged in cooperative 
efforts to pressure large construction users to follow more union-friendly policies, as they did in 
1986 with a corporate campaign that persuaded Toyota to build its US$800 million Kentucky 
factory with union labor. 
In the face of economic pressure from low-cost builders and political pressure from the 
Business Roundtable, ABC, and their allies in government, construction unionists were also 
forced into defensive battles to preserve prevailing wage laws that helped protect long-
established union standards. At the national level, regular attempts to repeal or gut the Davis– 
Bacon Act were turned back, but changes in regulatory enforcement gradually weakened the 
protection of prevailing wages on federally financed construction projects. In the last two 
decades, 10 of 41 states with ‘little Davis–Bacon’ laws repealed the legislation; the building 
trades led successful fights to retain prevailing wage laws in Massachusetts in 1988 and in 
Oregon in 1994. 
None of these union efforts prevented the steady erosion of industry standards or 
addressed the underlying problem of a growing non-union workforce. In the 1980s, a small but 
growing number of union leaders began to argue for a renewed commitment to organizing as the 
ultimate solution to the problem of declining union power—organizing the work, the contractors, 
and the workers. To organize the work, some building trades unions learned to intervene in the 
construction development process in ways that dissuaded public authorities or private users from 
awarding jobs to non-union contractors. To organize the contractors, unionists applied top-down 
persuasion or pressure on targets in ways that conveyed the real advantages of signing a 
collective bargaining agreement and the potentially costly disadvantages of battling with the 
union. In relatively strong union markets, the building trades experienced modest success in 
organizing the work and some non-union contractors. In weaker markets, it proved to be 
exceedingly difficult to check the expansion of the non-union movement without control of the 
skilled labor supply. 
In both strong and weak markets, construction unionists found that organizing 
unrepresented workers was a tough proposition. It was hard to identify and communicate with 
workers who moved from project to project and employer to employer. Unions experimented 
with a variety of tactics to overcome this obstacle, the most creative of which was salting non-
union job sites with union members who went to work for open shop contractors for the purpose 
of organizing. This tactic proved to be more effective in exposing unlawful conduct on the part 
of non-union contractors who routinely discriminated against union members and violated 
numerous laws and regulations than it was in organizing unrepresented workers. In some cases, 
union salts persuaded non-union workers to join the union, thus stripping employees away from 
their open shop contractors. But this approach was effective only when the union had an 
abundance of work. More important, organizers who sought to recruit non-union workers 
confronted three formidable obstacles: first, the more highly skilled workers—many of whom 
had sharpened their trade knowledge working on union projects as ‘permit hands’ in the 1960s 
and 1970s—were so valuable to their employers that they tended to be treated relatively well; 
second, workers who had sought and been denied union membership in years past harbored deep 
resentments toward the locals that had excluded them and were, therefore, reluctant to abandon 
their current employer; and, third, many leaders and members had not yet rejected their unions’ 
exclusionary membership philosophy nor were they ready to embrace newly organized workers. 
For many decades, African-American workers were among the primary victims of 
exclusion. National unions asserted that they did not maintain a strict color bar but, at the local 
level, it took determined pressure from civil rights advocates and lawyers throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s to open up union apprentice programs. By now, virtually all the trades, including the 
skilled mechanical crafts, have been expanded by affirmative action. The exclusion of women 
was a different matter because, unlike black men, they were never well represented in the 
construction workforce. In the last two decades, a host of organizations have prepared and 
supported women with little or no construction experience to break into the industry’s non-
traditional jobs and apprentice programs. Despite these efforts, female participation has been 
stuck at about two percent. Today, the issue of exclusion impacts new immigrants more than any 
other group of workers. 
In the late 1980s, when unions began turning their attention to organizing, their 
exclusionary membership policies often applied to all non-union workers regardless of race. The 
policy of exclusion was an obstacle to organizing which had to be dismantled. The IBEW 
designed a membership education program called the COMET (Construction Organizing 
Membership Education Training) to address the problem. Delivered by union-based trainers and 
driven by a participatory pedagogy, the COMET program helped members understand why 
organizing unrepresented electricians would enable their union to regain control of the skilled 
labor supply and to rebuild its bargaining strength. 38 After tens of thousands of members 
participated in COMET classes, the internal culture of the union began to shift at least enough 
for far-sighted local leaders to organize non-union electrical workers without facing the wrath of 
their membership. The IBEW’s success with the COMET inspired the AFL-CIO’s national 
Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD) and each of its 15 affiliates to adopt the 
COMET program. Many leaders attributed the rebirth of construction organizing in the late 
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1980s and early 1990s to this program. ‘COMET is the spark that has regenerated our union 
fervor,’ declared one union president in 1994, ‘[and] entailed nothing less than remaking our 
own culture.’39 But building support for organizing and doing it successfully were not one and 
the same. 
In salting campaigns, leverage derived from NLRB or other charges against lawbreaking 
employers occasionally induced non-union contractors to sign collective bargaining agreements. 
In stripping efforts, open shop employers sometimes signed union contracts to gain access to the 
local’s skilled workforce when faced with sufficiently severe labor shortages. But in both cases 
building trades locals rarely conducted traditional campaigns through which unrepresented 
workers organized around their immediate concerns, engaged in escalating concerted activity to 
force their employers to address those concerns, or generated enough collective power to compel 
contractors to negotiate and sign bargaining agreements. 
By the early 1990s, some construction unionists began advocating for a more advanced 
approach to organizing. They argued for mass workforce organizing rather than just individual 
recruitment. To overcome the futility of organizing one target at a time—and thus encumbering 
newly unionized contractors with the higher costs of a union contract while their chief 
competitors remained non-union—these leaders also proposed efforts to pursue multiple targets 
in single market-wide campaigns. In 1996, the Laborers conducted two market-wide campaigns 
in New York City, one in the asbestos abatement industry and the other in demolition. Several 
thousand new members—many of them immigrants from Latin America and Eastern Europe— 
were organized and large portions of both construction sectors were unionized. 
Some leaders saw an inherent limitation in this kind of single affiliate campaign. They 
suggested that no building trades affiliate could achieve lasting success on its own, that no single 
union could survive as an island of strength in a sea of weakness. These leaders also pointed out 
that the traditional craft jurisdictions of the union sector were not generally reflected in most 
open shop markets, and unless one union was prepared to organize ‘wall-to-wall’—an unlikely 
scenario at the time—it was necessary for building trades affiliates to coordinate their efforts in 
multi-union campaigns. 
In 1997, the Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD) launched the 
Building Trades Organizing Project (BTOP), a multi-union, market-wide, workforce organizing 
experiment. Between 1997 and 1999, all 15 BCTD affiliates sponsored this ambitious project in 
Las Vegas, during an extraordinary building boom that offered what was generally regarded as 
favorable organizing conditions. With support from the AFL-CIO, over US$6 million and 
seventy organizers were dispatched to assist Las Vegas local unions in their organizing efforts 
and local union membership increased from 18,820 to 25,400. 
The Roofers Union embraced the project’s mission of workforce organizing more 
enthusiastically than many other Las Vegas affiliates. In a model campaign, the union targeted 
Willis Roofing, which employed about 250 immigrant workers, many undocumented, and was 
the largest non-union roofing company in Nevada’s explosive residential market. The engine of 
the campaign was an active committee of Willis workers who mobilized their fellow roofers in a 
series of escalating concerted actions that included delegations, vigils, and unfair labor practice 
strikes. The faith-based community joined workers in protesting the company’s abusive practices, 
including its failure to pay for overtime and insistence that workers pay for legally required 
safety equipment. The union augmented the workers’ efforts with a comprehensive strategy that 
involved litigation, pressure on major residential developers, outreach to prospective homebuyers, 
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shareholder actions, and a national mobilization of allies. The combination of worker activity, 
community support, and creative pressure tactics resulted in a union contract that provided for a 
substantial raise and full employer-paid pension and health benefits. Willis Roofing also agreed 
to pay US$400,000 in back pay for wage and hour violations and US$100,000 in legal fees to 
BTOP. 
Energized by the victory, the union went on to organize other roofing contractors in Las 
Vegas and more recently in Phoenix, Arizona. They targeted Diversified Roofing, which 
controlled about 15 percent of the residential market and employed about 325 workers, mostly 
Latinos. Using the same kind of comprehensive strategy, the union persuaded Diversified to sign 
a collective bargaining agreement that provided employees with a wage increase, a health plan, 
training, and a future pension fund. As former Roofers organizing director and current national 
president John Martini put it: ‘We’re not going to wait like we did in Las Vegas. We’re going to 
do a real quick follow-up.’ Soon after Diversified signed the Roofers contract, the union 
distributed copies of the agreement to over twenty other roofing contractors in the Phoenix 
market. One of the targets said simply, ‘I can’t afford to fight them.’40 Despite the Roofers’ 
success, most other building trades affiliates remained ambivalent about the comprehensive 
organizing model. 
The next major multi-trade project was launched by the Department in 2000 in response 
to the proliferation of temporary agencies in construction. This national campaign—‘Temp 
Workers Deserve a Permanent Voice @ Work’—set out four basic goals: educating local union 
leaders and members about the temporary agency phenomenon; organizing workers who were 
dispatched by temporary agencies; unionizing contractors who utilized temporary firm services; 
and altering how temporary agencies operated to ensure that they followed all relevant 
regulations. The building trades focused on firms—like Tradesman and TradeSource—that 
dispatched skilled crafts as well as national day-labor firms—like Labor Ready and Labor 
Finders. The BCTD drew attention to the ways in which temporary agencies hurt unionized 
contractors and sought to supplant building trades hiring halls. And, through public scrutiny and 
legal action the campaign forced some firms to stop charging employees for check-cashing 
services, or avoiding appropriate workers’ compensations premiums. But, the trades had 
considerably less success in organizing temporary workers or unionizing new contractors. 
The successes and failures of these recent efforts have taught a new generation of leaders 
valuable lessons. There is a growing recognition that, as Ed Sullivan, president of the national 
Building and Construction Trades Department, says, ‘you have to spend your money on 
organizing.’41 As recently as 15 years ago, this straightforward statement would have generated 
controversy and political challenges. Today, a public commitment to organizing is the 
conventional wisdom, clearly within the mainstream of building trades union leadership thinking. 
Unions have hosted conferences and hired organizing directors but, too often, in the words of 
Carpenter president Doug McCarron, ‘the rhetoric was there but there was no follow through and 
no accountability.’42 
A successful program requires the development of a culture of organizing that permeates 
the entire union, from top to bottom. The leadership, staff, and membership have to embrace and 
promote an organizing capacity that involves shifting resources, hiring and training organizers, 
and developing the research capabilities to support top-down, bottom-up, and corporate 
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campaigns. The initial indicator of seriousness is, as always, financial. ‘Without alternative 
sources of revenue, you can’t organize,’ points out Laborers president Terry O’Sullivan. ‘When I 
came in, if I had committed 100% of the International’s budget to organizing, it wouldn’t have 
come close to being enough to grow.’43 
A growth strategy cannot succeed without a thorough examination and possible 
reorganization of the unions’ internal structures. Organizing programs have often bumped up 
against traditional exclusionary union policies—high initiation fees, multiple and unequal job 
referral lists, racial discrimination, and the remaining vestiges of ‘country-club’ unionism. 
Collective bargaining cannot be exclusively focused on protecting remaining union strongholds 
and should instead leverage the power of market density to assist weaker areas. For example, the 
New England Regional Council of Carpenters has successfully leveraged its strength in the 
highly unionized Boston area to compel contractors to sign agreements covering all six states in 
its jurisdiction, including much weaker union markets. 
The strong suit of the building trades unions is the capacity to provide craftsmen to an 
industry that still needs skilled workers. For all of the ABC’s efforts over the years to establish 
and publicize alternatives, union training programs enrolled fully 72 percent of all apprentices 
registered with the Department of Labor between 1989 and 2001. Further, union programs are 
responsible for 82 percent of all graduating apprentices. While open shop critics charge that 
unions train generalists in an age of specialization, the evidence suggests that the training 
remains effective. According to economist Peter Philips, a doubling of the rate of unionization 
leads to a 10–20 percent increase in labor productivity.44 
Too many union leaders cling to the notion that better marketing and promotion of the 
unions’ highly skilled workforce is the primary solution to the open shop challenge. 45 They 
recognize that open shop training programs face the constant obstacle of the individual 
contractor’s short-term business orientation and the resulting reluctance to invest in training that 
will, at best, pay dividends in the future and, at worst, benefit a competitor. The productivity 
differential is real and the union advantage worth publicizing but the substantially lower pay 
scales allow non-union firms to bridge the gap and successfully underbid union companies. In 
time, the knowledge gained from extended on-site experience also begins to compensate for the 
lack of formal training. ‘Our membership is finally seeing that there are a lot of good non-union 
employees out there, not like before,’ says Ed Hill, IBEW president.46 Therefore, union training 
must not only adhere to standards of excellence; it must reflect organizing goals. The curricula 
have to include the techniques and materials of residential and light commercial construction in 
addition to the skill sets of the sectors in which the unions have traditionally been based. 
At a time when 45 million Americans lack health insurance and the percentage of private-
sector workers covered by traditional defined benefit pension plans has been cut in half since 
1980, the benefits provided under most building trades agreements stand as an exceptional model. 
But these union benefits will be increasingly difficult to preserve in the face of intense 
competitive pressure from open shop employers that do not provide their workers with anything 
comparable. Small construction employers cannot afford good health and retirement programs 
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even if they wanted to without the advantage of the unions’ bulk purchasing power. In the face of 
the Roofers’ organizing drive in Arizona, one non-union subcontractor calculated that a union 
agreement would only add US$100 to the cost of every home and acknowledged that ‘there are 
benefits for the employees that I can’t otherwise provide.’47 
The collective value of building trades retirement funds is approximately US$210 billion. 
The sheer volume has built a foundation for the strategic use of shareholder activism to 
complement union organizing goals. Union funds file dozens of corporate governance reform 
proposals on an annual basis, in part to alter poor business practices of targeted companies and, 
in part, to create opportunities for discussions with corporate executives regarding construction 
labor policies. Some funds are being invested to support new union construction, to promote new 
technologies that union members can install and service, and to retrofit existing structures to 
enhance safety and expand union employment opportunities. 
The very system of benefits that services workers and their families has become a 
problematic competitive cost factor for union contractors. Annual double-digit inflation in healt h 
costs has pushed some collective bargaining hourly health contributions above the level of the 
minimum wage. The demographic trends of baby-boomer retirements combined with declining 
membership ranks have placed added pressure on fewer working union members to support more 
retirees. In 1980, 76 percent of the participants in multi-employer pension funds were active 
members; in 2001, the number slid to 50 percent.48 In many cases, the benefits portion of a 
union contract now exceeds one-third of the total compensation package. Only a growth strategy 
that recruits large numbers of young new workers into the building trades unions can offset this 
burden. 
Building trades unionists pride themselves on their political acumen and activism. Since 
the world of real estate and development is at the center of every community’s policy debates, 
union leaders recognize the importance of relationships with local politicians and permitting 
processes. A decision to build a project on a union basis can often be determined by political as 
much as financial factors. Ultimately, however, political influence on the local, state, and 
national levels is a numbers game. The 2004 presidential election was a prime example. 
According to exit polling, union membership was a critical determinant in voter behavior. For 
example, white male union members voted for John Kerry by 24 percentage points, while white 
men outside labor’s ranks supported George Bush by 26 points. Similarly, union gun owners 
supported Kerry by 12 points as compared with the general gun-owning public’s 20-point tilt to 
Bush. Yet the impressive internal mobilization efforts were not enough to overcome labor’s 
declining overall numbers. For this reason, Ed Sullivan argues that the building trades should 
emphasize organizing over political action: ‘If you’re successful in organizing, you’re 
automatically going to pick up some political clout.’49 
Efforts to improve labor relations have become much more common. ‘We have to make 
our contractors more competitive,’ says Joe Hunt, president of the Ironworkers. ‘If they don’t 
have a job, there’s no job for us to work on.’50 Construction users and owners have responded to 
these overtures. The fiercely antiunion construction committee of the Business Roundtable 
reorganized itself as the Construction Users Roundtable (CURT) in 2000, suggesting that the 
‘committee may have been a victim of its own success in promoting construction cost-
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effectiveness.’ Intel executive and CURT president Tom Weise has publicly questioned the 
validity of the Business Roundtable’s earlier recommendations. In the absence of union 
participation in Roundtable discussions, he suggests the reports were based on contractor-filtered 
perceptions of unions and tainted by management agendas. The CURT and building trades 
leaders have been meeting regularly to discuss training, labor supply, substance abuse, and other 
industry concerns. According to Carpenter president Doug McCarron, one of the labor 
participants, ‘They’re saying: ‘‘We need you guys. You’re the only ones that are doing the 
training. We did too good a job when we kicked your ass.’’ ’51 
While some owners may recognize the unions’ contributions, industry decision-makers 
still operate in a highly competitive arena, even in the most densely organized environments. Ed 
Malloy, president of the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York, 
describes the anti-union mentality of a new breed of developers. ‘They only see two issues—one 
is control of the job and the other is the bottom line.’52 Unionized contractors are not always the 
best allies of an organizing and growth approach. Like some members, union firms can view new 
signatories as competition in a static market, rather than as participants in an expanding one. In 
the final analysis, as crucial as quality training, sophisticated benefits programs, and labor– 
management cooperation may be, as Laborers president Terry O’Sullivan says, ‘market share 
drives the whole equation’ and is the factor that will determine conditions in the industry.53 
In 1995, when John Sweeney was elected president of the AFL-CIO in the Federation’s 
first contested election in forty years, a new spirit of hope was injected into a movement that 
appeared to be trapped in a downward slide. Labor activists were energized by a vision of growth 
and power that would come from intensified organizing and political work. But even after ten 
years of substantial efforts in both organizing and politics, union density slipped from 14.9 
percent to 12.5 percent (only eight percent in the private sector) and labor-supported candidates 
lost the last two presidential elections. This reality has sparked a debate in the labor movement 
about whether a dramatic change in strategic direction may be necessary to revitalize labor’s 
fortunes. The emerging debate about labor’s future touches every sector of the movement. The 
building and construction trades are no exception. 
Building trades leaders have publicly proclaimed their steadfast dedication to organizing 
and growth, while density in their industry has continued to fall. Why have construction 
unionists not achieved greater success in translating their rhetorical commitment to organizing 
into real world growth? What obstacles stand in the way of more measurable progress in raising 
unionization rates, recapturing lost markets, and rebuilding union strength? Are there structural 
impediments that have hindered the conduct of the multi-union, market-wide, workforce 
campaigns that many union leaders believe are necessary? Do building trades unionists lack the 
strategic imagination needed to revitalize their movement? 
One issue that has received particular attention recently is the ‘architecture’ of the House 
of Labor.54 For construction unionists there are at least four interrelated structural issues that 
have confounded efforts to reverse their declining strength: 
51
 Engineering News Record, 15 May 2000, 15; BNA Construction Labor Report 50, no. 2499 (2003): 1206–7; interview 
with Doug McCarron, 11 January 2005. 
52
 Interview with Ed Malloy, 25 January 2005. 
53
 Interview with Terry O’Sullivan, 23 December 2004. 
54
 Lerner, ‘An Immodest Proposal.’ This was one of the first articles that helped spark the debate about labor’s future. 
1. There is a mismatch between national union structures based on local affiliates that 
evolved in local markets, and the actual structure of the modern construction industry, 
which is increasingly dominated by regional and national contractors operating in 
regional and national markets. 
2. There is a mismatch between the need for a coherent and coordinated organizing 
strategy among locals within the same national union and the enduring tradition of 
local autonomy evidenced in all building trades affiliates. 
3. There is a mismatch between the structure of the Building and Construction Trades 
Department and its 300 constituent councils—which are voluntary associations that 
lack the power and authority to conduct coordinated organizing campaigns—and the 
challenge of unionizing a trillion-dollar industry with over five million unrepresented 
workers. 
4. There is a mismatch between the structure of the unionized sector of the industry, 
with its 15 separate affiliates representing different but increasingly overlapping craft 
jurisdictions, and the dynamics of the now dominant non-union sector, where 
traditiona l jur isdict ional line s are neit her reflected nor respected. 
In the case of the first mismatch, building trades locals were established in local 
construction markets where unions organized the local labor pool and local employers operated 
in those local markets. Responsibility for organizing and bargaining resided primarily with the 
local unions. But the industry is increasingly characterized by regional, national and even global 
contractors whose operations are no longer confined to local markets. Virtually every local union 
confronts contractors who operate in multiple local jurisdictions. Few locals possess the 
resources, capacity or strategic leverage to organize and bargain with the corporate builders who 
now dominate the industry. 
Often, when a local union successfully organizes a regional contractor, the newly 
unionized employer is frustrated and mystified by the national union’s structure. For example, a 
formerly non-union electrical contractor operating in Florida may sign a collective bargaining 
agreement with a local union based in Tampa. When this signatory employer successfully bids 
on a job in neighboring St Petersburg and sends his crew across the bridge from Tampa to the St 
Petersburg project site—which he routinely did prior to signing a contract with the Tampa 
local—he discovers that he has violated union rules that require that a certain number of his 
employees must now come from the St Petersburg local, that he pay a different wage rate in the 
St Petersburg local jurisdiction, and that he contribute to the health and welfare fund of the local 
where the project is undertaken. The line separating the Tampa and St Petersburg local union 
jurisdictions does not conform in any meaningful way to the actual structure and dynamics of the 
Florida construction market. In fact, while that ‘imaginary’ line retains great importance to the 
local unions, it presents itself as a real barrier to regional contractors who might otherwise be 
persuaded to sign collective bargaining agreements. 
Some national building trades unions have addressed this structural problem with 
procedural adjustments. For example, locals are strongly encouraged to accept ‘portability’ 
agreements that allow contractors to move their core employees across local jurisdictions. Others 
have responded by merging local unions into larger, better-resourced locals whose expanded 
geographic jurisdictions conform more closely to actual construction markets. For example, the 
Laborers have consolidated 32 New Jersey locals into 16 unions; the Sheet Metal Workers have 
consolidated 20 California locals into five unions. International Union of Operating Engineers 
Local 3 has nearly 42,000 members throughout its jurisdiction of northern California, northern 
Nevada, Utah, and Hawaii, making it the largest construction trades local in the United States. 
Several unions, including the Iron Workers, Painters, and Carpenters, have attacked this 
structural problem by creating regional councils that correspond to regional construction markets. 
In the Carpenters, President Doug McCarron has allowed local unions to maintain their essential 
identity, but the real power for organizing and bargaining has been transferred from local union 
officers to a powerful executive secretary-treasurer at the regional council. In some areas, this 
restructuring—with the increased resources and capacity it generated—has yielded impressive 
results. For example, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters—established in 1996— 
has built a staff of over forty organizers drawn from the rank and file; increased its membership 
from 20,301 to 25,269 in 2004, or about 24 percent; signed over 1,200 contractors; leveraged its 
power in strong union markets like Boston to compel employers to sign contracts covering all six 
New England states; and increased its market share from 79 percent to 92 percent in the Boston 
area, and from 38 percent to 54 percent throughout New England.55 
All of these initiatives to restructure, centralize, and merge are intended to modernize 
decades-old structures that no longer correspond to the real world industry they are meant to 
service and organize. But these very efforts can create a new set of problems. Mergers may 
produce unintended negative consequences, i.e. mega-locals headquartered in large metropolitan 
centers may remove the union’s presence in smaller communities and the ability to influence 
local politics. In addition, the move to centralize policy development and increase accountability 
may eliminate the balkanization of local autonomy and the ineffectiveness of competing and, 
occasionally, warring fiefdoms, but it can also undermine the perception or reality of democratic 
practices and diminish the members’ sense of ownership of and loyalty to their organizations. 
The second structural issue that demands attention is the contradiction between the need 
for a coordinated organizing strategy within national unions and the endur ing tradition of local 
union autonomy. Even if the jurisdiction of a local union matches the rough geography of a 
definable construction market, there is no guarantee that the local will build the capacity and 
execute a strategy to organize the unrepresented workers and unionize the non-union contractors 
operating in that market. Historically, building trades locals have exercised a great deal of 
autonomy over their own affairs. This has been a strength of the building trades; members 
generally feel a deep sense of attachment to their local union. But since the late 1980s, when 
many national building trades leaders recognized the need to open the doors of formerly 
exclusive local unions in order to organize the rapidly growing non-union workforce, many local 
leaders have remained unwilling to implement the internal changes necessary to launch effective 
organizing programs. National unions have encouraged locals to ‘change-to-organize’ and used 
educational tools, like the COMET program, to persuade both local leaders and members of the 
need to organize. But when local leaders lacked the will or desire, they relied on the tradition of 
local autonomy to avoid the difficult challenge of organizing. 
It is simply impossible to re-unionize an industry like construction—where nonunion 
employers and unorganized workers routinely cross local union jurisdictions— if one local union 
enthusiastically embraces its national union’s commitment to organizing while a sister local in a 
neighboring area continues to ignore the nonunion threat and refuses to open its doors to 
unrepresented workers. National leaders have sometimes been reluctant to challenge the 
longstanding tradition of local autonomy. In 2004, the Iron Workers targeted J. D. Steel, one of 
the largest contractors in the reinforcing steel industry operating in several southwestern states. 
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President Joe Hunt chartered a new organizing local—Regional Local 846 —in part to avoid the 
internal politics and policies that sometimes impede effective organizing. Deploying a 
comprehensive strategy, the Iron Workers organized several hundred mostly immigrant rebar 
workers, supported them through a protracted strike, mobilized broad community and political 
support, and eventually signed J. D. Steel to a multi-state collective bargaining agreement. 
In some rare cases, recalcitrant local unions have been put in trusteeship or merged into 
other locals. In the IBEW, President Ed Hill recently reclaimed the charter of Local 637, 
formerly based in Roanoke, Virginia, and divided its jurisdiction among locals in Washington, 
DC and West Virginia. This intervention was precipitated by the failure of Local 637 to enact a 
serious organizing program while the union’s share of the local construction market shrank to 
about three percent. ‘Did I enjoy doing that?’ asked President Hill. ‘Absolutely not. Nobody 
likes to play the heavy . . . The time for anger was over when they failed to organize . . . That’s 
when people should have gotten angry.’56 How can a leader drive a national organizing program 
when the union’s internal structure is built on and deferential to the tradition of local autonomy? 
How can a union conduct a national program in a disciplined and effective way without 
establishing and enforcing standards of accountability for its constituent local affiliates? 
However difficult it may be for national unions to resolve this autonomy dilemma, it is 
even more challenging for the Building and Construction Trades Department and its state and 
local councils. Conducting the kind of coordinated campaigns needed to reorganize the 
construction industry requires the active and authentic participation of multiple, independent 
craft unions. Building trades councils—like the AFL-CIO department to which they are 
affiliated—are voluntary associations that have not generally been able to achieve the level of 
unity and discipline required for such multi-union campaigns. 
This is the third structural conundrum that confronts building trades leaders struggling to 
revitalize their movement. Leaders of the 15 building trades affiliates generally concede that they 
cannot individually organize their own craft in the nonunion industry in isolation from the other 
trades. This recognition fueled the Building Trades Organizing Project (BTOP) and other less 
ambitious multi-trade campaigns. The Las Vegas project revealed how difficult it was to devise a 
common organizing strategy that each affiliate would pursue. The voluntary nature of affiliate 
participation meant that each union ultimately chose its own path. While some affiliates 
genuinely embraced BTOP’s mission, others abandoned the project when it was convenient to do 
so. The voluntary nature of the building trades structure—at the local and national levels— 
precludes the possibility of establishing and enforcing the clear standards of accountability and 
discipline that multi-union organizing campaigns like BTOP require. 
Some campaigns inevitably require multi-union participation. A sizable concrete 
foundation subcontractor, for example, may employ carpenters, cement finishers, ironworkers, 
laborers, and truck drivers. Under the present union structures, an organizing drive against this 
kind of target would involve the cooperation of up to five separate unions. If all of the relevant 
craft locals in that particular geographical jurisdiction do not have similar open door policies, 
organizing resources and staff, internal systems of accountability, and a willingness to set aside 
parochial concerns in favor of a joint effort, the campaign will not be able to speak forcefully to 
the employer or advocate for the entire workforce and, thus, is doomed to an early failure. The 
alternative—a ‘wall-to-wall’ campaign launched by the most highly motivated and best-
po sitioned affiliate—will immediately challenge traditional jurisdictional demarcations and spark 
a war of angry recriminations between the affected unions. 
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The fourth structural problem that the building trades face is the mismatch between the 
craft-based unionized sector and the actual organization of work in the dominant non-union 
sector. Many building trades leaders admit—though rarely for public attribution—that there are 
simply too many affiliates in the unionized sector of the industry. Historically, these affiliates 
grew out of well-defined crafts and have jealously protected their jurisdictions for over a hundred 
years. But this rigid craft orientation, and the 15 affiliates it supports, poses a two-fold problem. 
First, work in the unionized sector of the industry has evolved in ways that sometimes blur these 
craft lines. Without a strategy for union growth, the risk of jurisdictional disputes within the 
unionized sector increases. Second, when building trades unions attempt to organize the non-
union market, they discover that their strict craft jurisdictions are neither reflected nor respected 
in the organization of open shop work. Specialty contractors employing individual crafts exist in 
the non-union sector of the industry, but there are not 15 separate and distinct crafts. The 
structure of the building trades—with 15 different affiliates—does not match the structure of the 
non-union industry that must be organized. 
Even in those cases where a relatively distinct trade still exists in the non-union sector of 
the industry, the affiliate claiming jurisdiction for that work may be too small and under-
resourced to effectively organize it. When that is true, merging with other affiliates may have a 
compelling logic. But whether and how the 15 building trades might consolidate into fewer 
organizations is one of the most vexing questions facing construction union leaders After 26 
years as BCTD president, Robert A. Georgine suggested in his farewell address that it ‘makes 
sense’ for some of the smaller unions to join ranks with larger building trades affiliates. But his 
successor, Edward C. Sullivan, expressed no particular interest in tackling what he describes as a 
‘touchy subject.’57 It is hard to imagine many of the smaller nationa l unions voluntarily merging 
into larger, better-resourced organizations. There may be too much trade identity and craft pride 
standing in the way. On the other hand, even in the best of cases there are inherent limitations to 
what smaller affiliates can achieve. For example, the Roofers Union—which has shown talent 
and tenacity in conducting comprehensive campaigns—has fewer than 30,000 active members 
and may simply lack the resources and capacity to reorganize the non-union roofing industry on 
its own. 
While it may be necessary for the building trades to address these and other architectural 
issues, structural remedies alone are not enough to rebuild an unstable House of Labor. Many 
leaders have suggested that the labor movement, in general, and the building trades, in particular, 
pay insufficient attention to identifying and developing new leaders with the analytical skills, 
strategic vision, and political courage to revitalize organized labor. Ironically, building trades 
unions invest considerable time and resources into training apprentices who engage in classroom 
study and supervised fieldwork to acquire the requisite skills and knowledge to become journey-
level craftsmen and -women. This process often takes four or five years. But even those building 
trades unions that offer aspiring leaders formal and systematic training have not yet raised 
leadership development to the level of journeymen and apprentice training. 
Building trades unions can be just as relevant to solving today’s problems in construction 
as they were a century ago. Declining union density has resulted in an industry defined by 
undesirable working conditions and endemic labor shortages. The rise of the open shop sector 
has produced a race to the bottom. Some open-minded contractors and construction users agree 
and acknowledge that unions have historically helped stabilize an inherently unstable industry 
and are cautiously encouraging new alliances. Joint labor–management efforts can be helpful in 
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arenas where mutual interests overlap but, in the final analysis, unions will have to shape their 
own destiny and overcome the structural mismatches that hinder effective growth strategies. The 
experimentation of the last decade has resulted in the development of a number of tactics and 
options that point to promising new directions. The tasks of restructuring for growth, 
modernizing outdated practices, mobilizing the existing membership, and organizing the armies 
of the unorganized are the preconditions of a building trades revitalization. There is a plausible 
scenario in which unions are now poised to learn the lessons and hard truths from the past forty 
years winnow through the approaches that work, and discard the policies that have failed. Only 
with a rebirth of construction unionism can the men and women who build our buildings, roads, 
and bridges return to the solid standards and higher blue-collar status they once enjoyed. 
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